What do Americans think of Australian accents?

81 The special relationship between Australia and the USA: “All the Way”? Klaus Brummer 1 Introduction During the Second World War, Australia was increasingly threatened by imperial Japan. Australia realized that its traditional protecting power, Great Britain, was no longer able to maintain the country's external security. This function was taken over by the USA, which in response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, stopped Japan's advance on Australia. A possible invasion of Australia - beginning with massive air strikes on the port city of Darwin in February 1942, Japanese troops had repeatedly attacked the north coast of the country - was averted by the intervention of the USA. After the end of the fighting in the Pacific, Australia therefore endeavored to ensure its own security through a formal alliance with the USA, which became the new supreme power in the region. This goal was adhered to in the following decades. Probably no saying illustrates the importance of the special relationship with the "senior partner" USA for the "junior partner" Australia like that of the Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt, who assured the American President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ for short) against the background of the Vietnam War: "All the way with LBJ "(NAA 2014). Despite all the upheavals on a regional and global level that have occurred since Holt's statement in 1966, the relationship with the USA remains the decisive cornerstone of Australian security policy to this day. Against this background, this chapter analyzes the origins, developments and perspectives the special relationship between Australia and the USA. In relation to the overall conceptual framework of the volume, the special relationship is regarded as the variable to be explained. Several of the factors listed in Sebastian Harnisch's article (in this volume) with reference to theories of international relations (IB) and foreign policy analysis are used to explain the special relationship. Realistic motives for establishing and maintaining a special relationship in the sense of defending against a common enemy as well as liberal motives relating to community building among democratic states are taken up. Furthermore, factors such as the party ideology of the respective governments and the personalities and political convictions of the different decision-makers had and still have a decisive influence on the variance in the design of the special relationship between Australia and the USA. The following investigation is aimed initially at the establishment of the special Australian-American relationship in the aftermath of the Second World War. Then the development of the special relationship in the further course of the East-West conflict is presented. This is followed by the discussion of the special relationship since the global upheaval at the end of the 1980s. Finally, factors are worked out which, beyond the discussed case, can be of importance for the creation and development of special relationships. 2 The establishment of the special relationship The Second World War and its outcome led to several fundamental changes in or for Australia's foreign policy. First, during the war the country "grew up in foreign policy" in a certain sense. Significant here was the long-delayed adoption of the Statute of Westminster, which had been open to the Dominions since 1931, in 1942. The adoption of the Statute, which gave the Dominions legislative independence, also opened up the possibility of an independent foreign policy for Australia independent of that of Great Britain. Australia became an "independent player on the world stage" (Waters 1997: 38). Second, there was a growing awareness in Australia that a threat to their own security came less from Europe or the Middle East than from their own region. Accordingly, the country's military obligations for the Middle East, which Australia historically had to fulfill due to its connection to Great Britain, were to be reduced and its own capabilities were to be concentrated on Asia. Thirdly, the Second World War showed that Great Britain - as the traditional protecting power of Australia - had passed the zenith of its power and was less and less able (as well as willing) to guarantee security in the The special relationship between Australia and the USA: "All the Way" ? 83 Pacific in general and the security of Australia in particular. With the outbreak of the Pacific War, the United States took the place of Great Britain as the regional supremacy. Linked to this, the fourth change in Australian foreign policy ultimately consisted in the fact that from now on efforts were made to deepen relations with the new supremacy. Approaches to establishing a security partnership with the USA were already evident during the war. In view of the impending invasion of Australia by Japan, the Australian Prime Minister John Curtin (1941–1945) of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) referred in his New Year's address for 1942 to his country's desire to receive support from the United States, namely: " free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom ”(quoted from Day 1991: 55). Curtin's statement therefore outlined the development that was to become essential for Australian foreign policy in the post-war years: the establishment of a special relationship with the United States that was primarily motivated by security policy. 2.1 Evatt's failure Australian foreign policy in the second half of the 1940s is closely linked to the name of Secretary of State Herbert Evatt (1941–1949; ALP). Like none of his predecessors or successors, he shaped the foreign policy and external image of Australia. Evatt's policy comprised several guidelines: on the one hand, advocating an independent foreign policy for Australia as well as promoting a "liberal internationalism", according to which international conflicts should not be resolved through balance or power politics, but through economic development as well as diplomacy and multilateral institutions, above all by the United Nations (UN) (Waters 1997). On the other hand - and at least in part contrary to the two strands mentioned - he wanted to cultivate relations with Great Britain and the Commonwealth as well as with the USA. Evatt wanted to deepen relations with the USA as the new Pacific supremacy in economic and security policy terms. Most of his efforts failed, however. During his term of office, neither a trade and navigation agreement nor an agreement regulating double taxation could be concluded. In addition, there was the conflict over the use of Manus Island as a base for Klaus Brummer 84 by the USA (Renouf 1983: 121-122; Edwards 1991: 85). In connection with this question, Evatt made the proposal to set up a tripartite "defense board" including Australia, New Zealand and the USA. This should enable joint defense planning without stipulating an express military duty of assistance. After the American government became skeptical of his proposal in June 1946, Evatt immediately suggested a more informal solution. He was now thinking of a statement from the US in which it would confirm its participation in the defense of Australia and New Zealand. After a year, however, these negotiations also failed because the USA was no longer interested in using Manus Island (Renouf 1983: 146-156). The failure of Foreign Secretary Evatt's initiatives can be traced back to three reasons. One was in the personality of the foreign minister. According to many contemporaries, Evatt was a brilliant thinker whose outstanding intellect was paired with an enormous zeal for work. In personal dealings, however, he was considered difficult. This was evident not only in his behavior towards his personal co-workers or other members of the Australian government, but also towards representatives of other governments, including those of the USA: "Evatt's character was complex and of such a nature that most Western representatives who had much contact with him were more impressed by the bad traits than the good and came to dislike him - and more unfortunately to distrust him. This was especially the case with American diplomats in Canberra ”(Renouf 1983: 294). Evatt's relationship with decision-makers in Washington itself was hardly better. Personal animosities ensured that Evatt and representatives of the USA did not develop the basis of trust that would have been necessary for a security partnership. A second reason for his failure was Evatt's advocacy for a nationally guided Australian foreign policy and the associated larger and more independent role of his country in international politics. Evatt was not looking to break with the major Western powers: if Australian interests coincided with their interests, he saw a joint approach as necessary. A blind following, however, was out of the question. For example, within the framework of the UN, Australia repeatedly found itself in opposition to the USA (as well as Great Britain), for example when dealing with the crisis in Iran in 1946 or the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia (Lee The special relationship between Australia and the USA : "All the Way"? 85 1997: 57-60). Such Australian self-confidence was unacceptable for the great power USA at that time: “For its part, the United States did not deem such conduct either friendly or fitting for a Western country of limited power, one it had saved from Asian invasion (mainly for its own reasons). It would have preferred Australia to have behaved like a compliant ally "(Renouf 1983: 284). The third - and at the same time decisive - reason for the failure of a comprehensive security partnership with the USA during the ALP government until 1949 were changes in American interests. Global developments, in particular the end of the hostilities in the Pacific and the emergence of the confrontation with the Soviet Union, meant that the USA temporarily paid significantly less attention to the South Pacific and thus also to Australia. This was only to change again with the Korean War. 2.2 The Korean War as a Window of Opportunity In the course of the North Korean attack on the south in June 1950, Australia decided to send air and naval forces to Korea. In this way, the conservative “Coalition” government (consisting of the “Liberal Party” and the “Country Party) 1 under Prime Minister Robert Menzies (1949–1966; Liberal Party), which emerged victorious from the parliamentary elections of December 1949, set a conscious example their attachment to the United States. The measure was initiated by Secretary of State Percy Spender (1949–1951; Liberal Party), who wanted to use the deployment of Australian troops to support the US-led UN mission in Korea expressly to persuade the US to conclude a security agreement. Against the background of the experiences of the Second World War, Spender endeavored to implement a reorientation in Australian security policy (Spender 1969: 15). In contrast to the policy of the previous government, he was not looking to diversify partnerships. Instead, Spender wanted first and foremost a security ____________________ 1 Even if the composition of the “Coalition” has changed over the decades, the “Liberal Party”, founded in 1945, has remained significant to this day. Klaus Brummer 86 to establish a partnership with the USA, which was supposed to take on the role that Great Britain had previously played as the protective power of Australia. As a starting point, donor attempts by the USA to win Western states as partners for their intervention in support of South Korea. A first step in this direction was the aforementioned deployment of forces from the Australian Air Force and Navy at the end of June 1950 (O'Neill 1991: 103). However, Donors sought an even larger Australian contribution. When American President Harry Truman asked western states for further support in mid-July 1950, Spender tried to persuade Prime Minister Menzies to make further commitments. In this way, according to Spender, the benevolence of the USA could be generated from which Australia would benefit in the future: “[F] rom Australia's long-term point of view any additional aid we can give to the United States now, small though it may be, will repay us in the future one hundred fold ”(quoted from O'Neill 1991: 103). Nonetheless, Menzies was reluctant to expand his country's military contributions. This mainly affected the deployment of ground troops. At the same time, the UK very affectionate Prime Minister wanted to play for a while. He knew of ongoing discussions between the USA and Great Britain about a British contribution to the Korean mission and wanted to wait and see how the British would decide (O'Neill 1991: 103-104). Spender, on the other hand, criticized his prime minister's hesitant attitude. His main concern was that the value and usefulness of any further military contribution by Australia would be diminished if the commitment in this regard were not made until after the British decision (O'Neill 1991: 104). The Foreign Minister was accordingly alarmed when he learned on July 26 that a decision by Great Britain was imminent. He was particularly concerned about the consequences that Australian hesitation would have on the security pact he was aiming for (Pacific Pact) with the United States. Spender therefore made every effort to get the Australian government to pass a resolution before the British decision was announced. A practical hurdle turned out to be that Prime Minister Menzies was on a trip abroad to Great Britain and North America.2 Spender then called Finance Minister Arthur Fadden (Country ____________________ 2 On the other hand, the Prime Minister's absence also opened up political room for maneuver that Donor would otherwise not have had. The special relationship between Australia and the USA: "All the Way"? 87 Party), who acted as acting prime minister in the absence of Menzies. Spender managed to convince Fadden of the need for an immediate decision. The latter, however, insisted that Secretary of Defense Philip McBride (Liberal Party) also have to agree. After Spender had also convinced McBride, he drafted a statement announcing the immediate deployment of further Australian troops to Korea. This statement had been announced on the evening news an hour before Great Britain announced its decision to send troops to Korea (O'Neill 1991: 105). When Donor was able to reach Prime Minister Menzies, who was just crossing the Atlantic to the USA on board a ship from England, unexpectedly by telephone, he gave him a rough outline of the decision. According to Spender, Menzies was not happy with the news: “He was obviously put out. […] [E] ven over the distance of some 12,000 miles, I [Spender] was aware of the sourness in his voice ”(Spender 1972: 284). For Spender, it was more important than the mood of the Prime Minister that he was able to demonstrate to the USA that Australia was ready to support its foreign policy with his advance, detached from Great Britain. This promised him rapid progress for the security partnership with the Americans. The following section shows that Spender's calculation worked out. 2.3 ANZUS Treaty The ANZUS Treaty3 (also known as the “Pacific Pact”) was signed on September 1, 1951 in San Francisco. After ratification by the three contracting parties - these were Australia, New Zealand and the USA - the treaty entered into force on April 29, 1952. Even today, the importance of the ANZUS Treaty for Australian security policy cannot be overestimated. TB Millar (1991: 174) emphasized, for example, four decades after the conclusion of the contract that this “is still the ____________________ 3 The term is composed of the first letters of the three contracting parties Australia (Australia), New Zealand (New Zealand) and USA (United States). Klaus Brummer 88 mainstay of Australian diplomacy and the formal framework for the defense relationship with and dependence upon the United States. “Based on the provision of Australian troops for Korea, Foreign Minister Spender intensified his efforts in the second half of 1950 to complete the Truman government of a security agreement with Australia.As in the case of the Korea question, he was again faced with resistance within the cabinet. These came in particular from Prime Minister Menzies, who questioned the usefulness of an agreement mainly because, in his opinion, the US was extremely open to Australia's security interests even without an agreement. He therefore did not attribute any recognizable added value to a formal agreement (O’Neill 1991: 106). Once again, however, Spender did not allow himself to be deterred by resistance, but instead promoted his project both to the American government and in the Australian parliament. At a meeting with US President Truman in Washington in mid-September 1951, Spender based his request on two arguments. On the one hand, he referred to the willingness of his country to take on international responsibility, both during the Second World War and during the ongoing war in Korea. On the other hand, the Foreign Minister complained that there was no forum in which Australia had a voice on regional and global security issues. For this reason, the creation of a “Pacific Pact” should not only bring together several states in the region, but above all would also involve the USA in the regional security architecture (Spender 1969: 40-42). After his return to Australia, Spender was able to convince Prime Minister Menzies of his plan at least to the extent that he could make a further push for an agreement in the Australian Parliament.4 In a speech at the end of November 1950, he first referred to what he believed was becoming increasingly evident Shortcomings of the UN as well as the lack of a NATO-like organization for the Pacific region. For these reasons, Australia plays a “relatively minor part in influencing policies and events which inevitably involve Australia” (Hansard 1950: 3169). The conclusion of an agreement for the Pacific is therefore necessary because ____________________ 4 donors had already advertised his project in March and June 1950 in front of parliament. The special relationship between Australia and the USA: "All the Way"? 89 Australia would be enabled in this way to “express its considered opinion on matters which affect its own vital interest” (Hansard 1950: 3169). Ultimately, however, external developments should be decisive for the conclusion of the ANZUS contract. After the Korean War had again directed the United States' attention more strongly to Australia and the South Pacific in general and thus at least made the conclusion of a security agreement within the realm of possibility, it was the negotiations on a peace treaty with Japan that Spender knew how to use to get the Americans into a deal. His reasoning was as follows: If the US wanted to refrain from stipulating Japan's continued renunciation of rearmament in the peace treaty - which the US saw as an important ally in the context of the Cold War - then a military alliance between the US and Australia would be imperative necessary to protect one's own country from possible future aggression by Japan (Spender 1969: 80-81). The breakthrough for Australia came in mid-February 1951 when the American chief negotiator for the peace treaty with Japan, John Foster Dulles, traveled to Canberra. At the end of four days of negotiations, in which New Zealand's Foreign Minister Frederick Doidge also took part, there was a draft text that was to be adopted with minimal changes to the ANZUS treaty. From an Australian perspective, the provisions on mutual support between the contracting parties were essential, in particular Article 4: “Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area of ​​any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process. "With the ANZUS treaty, the Australian-American relations gained a new quality under international treaty law, which the main initiator commented:" [A] s events since have revealed, the [ANZUS treaty marked the, note d. Autors] commencement of the 'special relationship' "(Spender 1969: 162). In summary, the establishment of the Australian-American special relationship in the aftermath of the Second World War can be traced back to the interplay of several factors. In accordance with the realistic perspective, in the context of the looming East-West conflict, perceptions of external threats had a significant influence on the formalization of the special relationship, which resulted in the ANZUS contract. The special relationship between Klaus Brummer 90 and the liberal perspective was facilitated and promoted by the shared institutions and values ​​of the two democratic states. The fact that external threats and democracy were not sufficient to establish the special relationship was shown by the lasting influence that party ideologies (ALP "vs." Coalition) and in particular decision-makers (Evatt "vs." donors) had on the creation of the special relationship. 3 The special relationship in the further course of the East-West conflict The focus of the Australian-American special relationship was (and still is today) on exchange and cooperation on security and intelligence issues. One of the "practical consequences" was the establishment of several American intelligence "installations" (Pine Gap, Northwest Cape, Nurrungar) on Australian territory in the 1960s. Even more prominent expression of the special relationship during the East-West conflict, however, was Australia's participation in the Vietnam War on the side of the USA. However, bilateral relations did not remain free of tensions. They reached their lowest point in the 1970s when the ALP temporarily resumed government affairs. 3.1 "All the way with LBJ" Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War was remarkable because it was the first time that the country took part in a war in which its former protector Great Britain was not also involved. The decision illustrates the security independence that Australia had gained from Great Britain in the aftermath of World War II. The engagement in Vietnam, however, also illustrates the new dependency that the country had become through its connection to the USA. Goldsworthy (2002: 2) therefore speaks of "the transfer of Australia’s primary security relationship from Britain to the United States of America". To ensure its own security - especially against feared attacks by Asian countries - Australia was dependent on protection from the USA. Although this did not lead to a blind following, it did lead to an overwhelming self-interest - The special relationship between Australia and the USA: "All the Way"? 91 the interest in keeping the USA in the region from a military point of view by means of its own measures and in this way preserving the American security guarantee for Australia. This is the background against which Australia's central motives for participating in the Vietnam War can be seen. The developments in Vietnam itself were not insignificant for Australia, as the spread of communism in Asia was seen as a real threat to their own country. Even if the developments “on the ground” were significant, the more fundamental motive of the conservative Australian governments seems to have been to assist the Americans in Vietnam so that they would also support Australia in the event of a potential future attack on its territory: “Australia went to Vietnam as an insurance premium for United States protection in the event of an ultimate if unforeseeable situation of (another) threat from Asia ”(Millar 1991: 174). The decisions of the Australian governments to send and later to withdraw their troops therefore largely followed those of the USA, albeit with a noticeable delay. In addition, the extent of participation was significantly smaller (Pemberton 1987; Frost 1987). In the wake of the USA, Australia sent military advisers to Vietnam as early as mid-1962. Even if their military use remained limited, from the American point of view they primarily fulfilled diplomatic and political purposes of legitimation (Millar 1991: 187). When the USA sent a request for military support in Vietnam to more than a dozen western states in mid-1964, Australia was the only country that immediately complied (Millar 1991: 188). Other military advisers, including driver instructors and half a dozen Australian transport planes, were deployed. The Australian contingent then experienced a significant increase in the course of the escalation of the Vietnam conflict by the US government under Lyndon Johnson. Just a few weeks after Johnson's decision to send "Marines" to Vietnam in early April 1965, the Menzies government decided to deploy an infantry battalion. In confidential discussions within the Cabinet's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Prime Minister left no doubt about his motives. In addition to promoting Australian security interests in the region, the psychological effect of sending a battalion to the USA would be "phenomenally valuable, including in Australia’s interest" (quoted from Edwards 1992: 362). Klaus Brummer 92 Once again the US government was grateful for the Australian support. An employee of the American State Department then described Australia as "by far the most 'politically significant" US ally in Vietnam "(quoted from Millar 1991: 190). Not least of all, what was remarkable about this "politically significant ally" was that the Menzies government initially withheld the decision from the public and then, after it had leaked, "helped" the truth by claiming that the Australian battalion was deployed on request the South Vietnamese government would have declined. There had been such a request; However, it did not take place until the end of April, three weeks after the resolution of the Australian government and two weeks after the transmission of this resolution to the USA (Edwards 1992: 367-375; Martin 1999: 515-520). In terms of personnel, Australia's participation in the Vietnam War reached its peak in the wake of the Australian parliamentary elections in November 1966, when the contribution was increased to around 8,300 members (Frost 1987: 25) .5 In declaratory terms, however, Australian allegiance to the United States had already reached its peak a few months earlier. When the Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt, who had replaced Menzies as Prime Minister in January 1966, traveled to the USA in the summer of 1966 - where he received a “hero's welcome” (Millar 1991: 184) - he made it in the collective memory to this day The Australian established the phrase “all the way with LBJ” (NAA 2014) .6 When President Johnson traveled to Australia in October of the same year, he was also given a warm welcome. However, given the rapidly deteriorating situation in Vietnam, the high spirits did not last. In both countries the war in Vietnam became visibly unpopular, which was expressed, among other things, in mass demonstrations. Parallel to the withdrawal of the American troops, the Australian troops left Vietnam in 1971/72. Even if the Vietnam War ended in defeat for the USA and thus also for Australia, which was fighting on its side, ____________________ 5 estimated Australia had a total of 500 dead and 3,000 wounded in the course of the war (AWM 2014). 6 Holt's statement matched one of the electoral slogans of Johnson's 1964 presidential campaign. The special relationship between Australia and the US: "All the Way"? 93 the Australian government views its own commitment as positive, due to the political and economic consequences it had for the relationship with the superpower: “Australia had become an important friend of the major superpower, applauded for its loyalty, always informed if not always consulted. This cordiality extended to economic matters, including capital loans "(Millar 1991: 192). A short time later, however, Australian-American relations were in their deepest crisis. 3.2 The special relationship in its “most turbulent phase” After almost 23 years in the opposition, in 1972 the ALP returned to government responsibility. Even if the government led by Gough Whitlam (1972–1975) only lasted three years, this period became “the most turbulent time in the history of the relationship since the two countries signed the ANZUS treaty” (Curran 2013: 1). Conflicts arose particularly over the Vietnam War - the ALP had refused to send Australian troops from the start - as well as in other questions of Asian policy. An important reason for the deterioration in the relationship was also the changed interests of the “senior partner”. After years of increased engagement, the USA under President Richard Nixon not only wanted to achieve a “Vietnamization” of the war, but also generally wanted to play a less prominent role in Asia. The “Nixon Doctrine” accordingly demanded a far greater independence of the American allies in the region in guaranteeing their own security. For Australia, this resulted in the question of what the assistance clause enshrined in the ANZUS treaty was still worth at all (Curran 2013: 4f.). These and other changes in Asia - ranging from the economic rise of Japan to a more self-confident demeanor of the People's Republic of China and Indonesia to the withdrawal of Great Britain "east of Suez" (Curran 2013: 7) - not only created pressure for action on Australia. At the same time, they also opened up new areas of action. Ironically, it was precisely the policy of the Nixon government (Nixon doctrine, recognition of the People's Republic of China, policy of détente towards the Soviet Union, etc.) that created the conditions under which the Whitlam government could pursue a more independent Australian foreign policy, especially in Asia. However, this policy repeatedly led to conflicts with the USA (Bell 1994: 106f.). Klaus Brummer 94 After decades in the opposition, the ALP was eager to provide its own foreign policy impetus for domestic reasons. Henry Albinski (1977: 61) speaks of "the urgency to 'set things right" ", also with regard to Australia's position vis-à-vis the USA. A break with the USA was expressly not intended because, in Whitlam's assessment, this was essential for Australia's security. Rather, the aim was to steer bilateral relations in “more fruitful and constructive directions” (quoted from Curran 2013: 12). Australia's more independent foreign policy should therefore be carried out within the framework set by the special relationship (Pemberton 1997: 139). Nonetheless, decisions by the Whitlam government repeatedly led to intense disputes. This included the withdrawal of the remaining Australian military advisors and the cessation of military aid to South Vietnam and the establishment of diplomatic relations with China and North Korea, among others. Indications of Australia's possible exit from the “Southeast Asia Treaty Organization” (SEATO) also met with little approval in Washington (Curran 2013: 3, 19). In addition to the contradictions in terms of content, there was a disturbed relationship of trust between Whitlam and Nixon. The reason for this was in particular "an undiplomatically vigorous letter of protest and criticism" (Bell 1994: 110) from the Australian Prime Minister to the US President, in which he criticized and suggested that the US president for the bombings of Vietnam at the end of 1972 ("Operation Linebacker II"), to return to negotiations. The American reaction to the letter was just as unsurprising as the consequences of the letter for bilateral relations: "Washington was aghast - Australia had moved from being its staunchest Cold War ally to being a leading critic" (Curran 2013: 14). Even the continued existence of ANZUS was not left unquestioned, especially in the event that Whitlam should actually lead Australia out of SEATO. Not least as a result of the change of government in the USA in August 1974 from Nixon to Gerald Ford, bilateral relations recovered a little by the end of the ALP government (Bell 1994: 108). A major change did not begin until the end of 1975 when the ALP government was replaced by a coalition government under Malcolm Fraser (1975–1983; Liberal Party) (Millar 1977: 862). The level of Australian allegiance to the USA, as it began under Menzies / Spender and reached its peak under Holt, has not, however, been reached again.The special relationship between Australia and the USA: “All the way”? 95 the perspectives of the two countries especially on Asia, where the Fraser government was now also striving for a more independent role for Australia. Nonetheless, the tensions between the superpowers USA and the Soviet Union, which intensified at the end of the 1970s, ensured that the special Australian-American relationship regained a significant place in Australian foreign policy. In summary, for the development of the special relationship in the further course of the East-West conflict, it can be said that the security aspect continued to play a central role, especially for the smaller partner Australia. This was particularly evident in the country's involvement in the Vietnam conflict on the side of the USA, where Australia, in addition to the developments in the conflict region itself, was primarily concerned with demonstrating its own reliability, which should guarantee continued protection by the USA. In addition, this phase also showed the influence that party ideologies and the individual preferences of individual decision-makers can have on the state of special relationships. This is especially true of the low point reached by Whitlam-Nixon relationships. 4 The special relationship since the end of the East-West conflict Even after the end of the East-West conflict, there was considerable variance in the Australian-American special relationship, although the “spikes” in both the positive and the negative were not as extreme as in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather, since 1989 a domestic political consensus has developed between the relevant Australian parties on the centrality of the relationship with the USA, which in particular anticipates crises such as the times of the ALP governments under Chifley / Evatt and Whitlam. Although these governments did not want to turn away from the USA, they did want to relativize the importance of the special relationship for Australia. With the exception of the Keating government, the younger ALP governments did not follow this goal. For conservative governments, relations with the United States have always been decisive. Accordingly, the following applies today: "No government would challenge the centrality of the US alliance to Australia’s defense and foreign policies" (Cotton / Ravenhill 2011: 1). It is noteworthy that this attitude has prevailed despite - or perhaps because of - the rise of China in the region in general and as Australia's most important trading partner in particular. Klaus Brummer 96 The consensus between the major Australian parties on the importance of the relationship with the USA was first shown under the ALP government under Bob Hawke (1983–1991), which marked the return to the “tradition of dependence on the United States ”(Firth 2011: 22). In contrast to the previous ALP heads of government, Hawke proved to be a staunch supporter of the USA. This became particularly clear during the “ANZUS crisis” 7 and when it supported the USA in the Gulf War in 1990/91, when Hawke pushed through the deployment of naval forces against the resistance of the left wing of his party (Cockburn 1992). The Australian participation in the intervention for the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 was not a problem for Hawke - in the tradition of Evatt - because the mission was mandated by the UN. In addition, however - in line with the conservative governments in the context of the wars in Korea and Vietnam - Hawke's assessment that the American security guarantee for Australia would be perpetuated by sending his own troops to the US-led mission (Bell 1994: 161f.). For Hawke, who is said to have “unlimited enthusiasm for the Americans” (Firth 2011: 42), this goal was more important than the “traditional” foreign policy objectives of the ALP. Hawke's successor as Prime Minister, Paul Keating (1991–1996), on the other hand, relied more on the “classic” foreign policy issues of the ALP in the form of nationalism, regionalism and multilateralism. Gareth Evans, who as foreign minister between 1988 and 1996 had a lasting influence on the foreign policy of the Hawke and Keating governments in particular, described Australia as “as a middle power with a strong Asia pacific orientation, pursuing confidently and actively - at global, regional and bilateral levels as appropriate - clearly defined geopolitical interests, economic interests and what can be described as good international citizenship issues "(Evans 1997: 18). In addition to the intensive ____________________ 7 The trilateral ANZUS treaty broke down in the mid-1980s when New Zealand decided on a "nuclear-free policy", which from then on prohibited the US Navy from calling at New Zealand ports with nuclear-powered ships or ships equipped with nuclear weapons. whereupon the USA formally suspended its obligations towards New Zealand as set out in the ANZUS treaty in 1986 (Catalinac 2010). Since then, the annual meetings between Australia - which sided with the Americans in the wake of the crisis - and the USA to discuss defense policy issues in the context of the ANZUS treaty have been known under the acronym "AUSMIN" (Australia-US Ministerial meetings). The special relationship between Australia and the USA: "All the Way"? As a result, regional issues and partnerships (including Japan) came to the fore, with Australia attempting to distinguish itself as an independent actor vis-à-vis the Asian states. Traditional bilateral relationships, while still important, were no longer relevant. Rather, economic issues gained importance in foreign policy. This was at the expense of security policy aspects and also reduced the importance of the special relationship with the USA (Bell 1994: 172f.). However, the above-mentioned shifts in foreign policy did nothing to change the central importance of the USA for the security of Australia. The same applied to the efforts that began in the late 1980s to achieve greater military independence for Australia within the framework set by ANZUS (“self-reliance within ANZUS”), since the dependence on American equipment and logistics could not be overcome (Cheeseman 1993: chap. 6). After the loss of importance during the Keating government, the special relationship experienced another high phase under his conservative successor John Howard (1996-2007; Liberal Party). In the tradition of previous coalition governments, bilateral relations have returned to the center of Australian foreign and security policy. This was particularly true of the relationship with the USA: “Howard constructed Australian foreign policy around the fulcrum of the American alliance” (Firth 2011: 55). This earned the prime minister the reputation of being almost blind to the US: “Howard was best known to the public as dogged and apparently unreserved ally of Bush” (Cotton / Ravenhill 2011: 6). In any case, by sending Australian troops to the US-led missions Operation “Enduring Freedom” (fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, among others) and “Operation Iraqi Freedom” (regime change in Iraq), Howard became one of the closest allies of the US government under George W. Bush. It is remarkable - and almost a little ironic - in the interaction between the two countries that it was the Australian Prime Minister who, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, “invoked the ANZUS Treaty, the first time this had happened in the history of the ANZUS alliance "(Firth 2011: 55). The junior partner thus stood by the senior partner preemptively. Howards' motive was of course the same: a military contribution from Australia to an American military operation was still considered an investment in the future protection of its own country. Klaus Brummer 98 Regardless of Howard's orientation towards the USA: The strategic orientation of the senior partner is still decisive for the continuation and the intensity of the special relationship. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the American focus was primarily on developments in Europe and the Middle East. The Pacific region and with it Australia lost in importance. This has changed in recent years with the rise of China and the “pivot” (also: “rebalancing”) to Asia propagated by US President Barack Obama, so that Australia has regained importance as an American alliance partner. An important pillar of American politics are the bilateral alliances with states in the region, which, according to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, represent "the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific" (Clinton 2011). One of these alliances, which are to be modernized and further strengthened, is the one with Australia, whose "counsel and commitment [...] was indispensable" (Clinton 2011), for example in strengthening the regional security architecture. Probably the most tangible consequence of the recent intensification of security cooperation between the USA and Australia is the stationing of American marines in the northern Australian port city of Darwin, which was decided in November 2011 and started the following year, and their number is expected to grow to 2,500 in the next few years. As expected, the USA's increased turn to Asia was welcomed in Australia (Rudd 2013; White 2013). The renewed switch to ALP-led governments under Kevin Rudd (2007–2010 and 2013) and Julia Gillard (2010–2013) did not change anything. Rudd carried out his campaign promise by withdrawing Australian troops from Iraq by mid-2009. However, there was no doubt either at home or abroad about Rudd's generally positive attitude towards the USA (Cotton 2011). For example, his proposal for an “Asia Pacific Community” was specifically aimed at keeping the USA in the region (Cotton / Ravenhill 2011: 6). In turn, it was Gillard who - despite concerns from the Chinese side - announced the aforementioned stationing of American marines in Australia together with US President Obama. In view of the policies of the recent ALP governments that underline the importance of the USA, Cotton and Ravenhill (2011: 12) state a “strong continuity between the Rudd-Gillard governments and their predecessors from the other side of the political spectrum”. The special relationship between Australia and the USA: "All the Way"? 99 As an outlook, it can be stated that as a result of the increase in importance of China that is expected in the coming years - if not decades - for the USA, the Pacific and thus also Australia will be of great strategic interest. On the Australian side, the central importance of the security partnership with the USA is unlikely to change, especially since the Conservatives, led by Tony Abbott (Liberal Party), took over the business of government again after the elections in September 2013. In economic terms, however, China has already overtaken the United States in Australia. For the first time in the history of Australia, the most important trading partner is not also the most important security partner (Cotton / Ravenhill 2011: 9-10). The conservative government under Howard was still considered "unconcerned by the potential for strain as Australia sought to maintain its security relationship with the United States while it became increasingly dependent economically on China, the rising strategic and economic competitor to the United States" (Barker 2011 : 16). For the Abbott government and its successors, such an attitude or a “compartmentalization” of relations with the two states (White 2013) will become increasingly difficult to enforce. How the asymmetrical security partnership with the USA can be reconciled with the equally asymmetrical economic partnership with China should not only be the central foreign policy question for Australia, but also for the future of the Australian-American special relationship. In summary, a reduced relevance of external threats for the special Australian-American relationship can be ascertained for the phase since the end of the East-West conflict. The US's turn to the Pacific, largely motivated by the rise of China, is welcomed by the Australian side. However, the now strong economic ties with China mean that Australia sees the Chinese rise more clearly as an opportunity than is the case on the American side, where questions about US supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region are more important. The fact that even in the current phase individuals continue to have a strong influence on the state of the special relationship was particularly evident during the reign of Howard and Bush and the associated further deepening of the relationship. On the other hand, the political contradictions on the Australian side with regard to questions relating to the connection to the USA have weakened, since the most recent ALP governments have also followed the largely uncritical USA-friendly course of the coalition governments. Klaus Brummer 100 5 Conclusions for (asymmetrical) special relationships The discussion of the Australian-American special relationship refers to several factors that can also be of importance for other bilateral, asymmetrical special relationships. With regard to the establishment of a special relationship, the present case underlines the importance of threat perceptions, conflicts and global shifts in power, in accordance with the realistic perspective. In addition to the Second World War, Great Britain's loss of hegemony and the rise of the USA to a world power, the onset of the Cold War, the Korean War and the negotiations on a peace treaty with Japan should be mentioned. The latter developments not only changed the interests of the future "senior partner" in the special relationship (USA), but also gave the future "junior partner" (Australia) a lever with which the senior partner could establish the special relationship (in the form of signing of the ANZUS treaty) could be moved - but, mind you, not forced. The similarities between the two states with regard to the democratic form of government, highlighted by the liberal perspective, also favored and promoted the development of the special relationship. While the junior partner had a disproportionate influence in the initiation of the special relationship, the asymmetrical power potential of the two states in favor of the senior partner became noticeable in the subsequent development of the special relationship. The expectations of the senior partner towards the junior partner are clear: the greater their support, the more robust the state of the special relationship. The Australian contributions to the wars in Vietnam and Iraq then caused high phases in bilateral relations. On the other hand, if the junior partner does not act in accordance with the senior partner's expectations, the special relationship suffers. In view of the power imbalance, it is the junior partner who has to fear any “sanctions” from the senior partner. One should think, for example, of "Nixon's wrath" (Curran 2013: 17) against Whitlam as a result of his criticism of the US policy on Vietnam. The concrete benefits of a special relationship, in turn, could be unevenly distributed, especially in asymmetrical relationships. In principle, both sides should benefit from the special relationship. For the senior partner, the relationship can be relevant for political reasons or for reasons of legitimacy. The special relationship between Australia and the USA: “All the Way”? 101 however the junior partner have. In addition to security guarantees, which will be discussed shortly, this may include, for example, upgrading one's own position vis-à-vis third countries due to the special relationship with the senior partner. In terms of content, the Australian-American case illustrates, in accordance with the realistic perspective, the central importance that security issues (“hard security”) can assume in special relationships. By entering into a formal alliance, the junior partner promises to be protected against military aggression by third parties. This protection is provided by the senior partner. For Australia, the special relationship with the USA is still the main reassurance against attacks by other states. The protective shield established by means of the special relationship can also be the reason why the junior partner wants to demonstrate to the senior partner through foreign policy activities or believes that he is committed to having to demonstrate in order to secure military support in this way (O'Connor / Vucetic 2010: 542). An accommodating attitude of the junior partner towards the senior partner is therefore not necessarily to be equated with submission, since well-understood self-interest (security) can underlie this attitude.The Australian participation in American military interventions is therefore a kind of “premium” that is paid for the security policy “reinsurance” by the USA. In this context, the “alliance security dilemma” should be cited from a rationalist perspective, which among other things points to the risks of “abandonment” and “entrapment” in the context of alliance relationships (Snyder 1984). The junior partner in particular is afraid of being "abandoned" by the senior partner and thus losing his protection. For this reason, he follows the senior partner without, however, having any significant influence on his decisions ("entrapment"). For Australia this was shown, for example, in the Iraq war (Doig et al. 2007: 26). The extent to which parties and party ideology can influence the development of special foreign policy relationships is difficult to assess on the basis of the present case. What is certain is that the most difficult phases in the special relationship coincided with the takeover of the Australian government by the ALP. Their "foreign policy tradition" (Lee / Waters 1997) is characterized by the emphasis on the independence of Australia, the regional level and the multilateral integration of the country (especially in the UN), which are more strongly emphasized than the old bilateral relations (Great Britain) and new (USA) great powers. In this respect, there have long been clear differences in the priorities of ALP governments compared to the foreign policy of coalition governments, in which bilateral relations have always had priority, regardless of whether the American president is a Democrat or a Republican. Since the end of the East-West conflict, however, these differences in focus between the ALP and the Coalition seem to have largely been lost, which is clearly evident in the policies of the ALP-led governments under Hawke, Rudd and Gillard, all of which are central Emphasized the importance of the special relationship with the USA. Either the ALP has moved in the direction of the coalition or the deterioration in bilateral relations during several ALP-led governments was simply a "coincidence", as Coral Bell (1994: 131) argues. Gregory Pemberton (1997: 140) criticizes this assessment as a “remarkable and insupportable conclusion”. In view of the ALP's “foreign policy tradition” described during the East-West conflict, it would indeed be a great “coincidence” if there were no connections between the ALP's governance and the deep phases of bilateral relations. Finally, the Australian-American case also illustrates the potential importance of individual decision-makers for the creation and development of special relationships. The fact that a security agreement was not concluded with the USA under the ALP governments (1941–1949) was primarily due to reasons located in the international system (especially the East-West conflict). To make matters worse, however, was the strained relationship between American government representatives and Australian Foreign Minister Evatt. The fact that an agreement could be reached under his successor, Spender, in less than two years was not due to the beginning of the Korean War, but also to Spender's good relationships with the relevant American decision-makers. And the fact that bilateral relations deteriorated in the first half of the 1970s was not only due to the new substantive accents in Australian foreign policy under Whitlam, but also to the disturbed personal relations between the heads of government of the two states. While structural factors seem to define the framework of special relationships, it is individual actors who fill this framework. The special relationship between Australia and the USA: "All the Way"? 103 Literature Albinski, Henry S. 1977: Australian External Policy Under Labor. 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